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CASE COMMENT: ADOPTIVE COUPLE V. BABY 
GIRL, 133 S. CT. 2552 (2013) 
ANIETIE MAUREEN-ANN AKPAN* 
This Comment discusses the 2013 United States Supreme Court case of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 
which involved an unwed Cherokee father’s (Petitioner) journey to regaining custody of his child, after 
erroneously granting consent of the child’s adoption to a non-Indian couple.  This Comment further discusses 
the issues that arise within transracial adoptions, including “cultural authenticity” of adoptive parents and the 
significance of providing cultural outlets for a transracial adopted child.  This Comment will also address the 
lack of constitutional protection for unwed fathers in family cases, specifically the “sub-class” of unwed fathers 
to which the Petitioner belongs.  Generally, this Comment examines the intersectionality of race relations, 
racial identity and how society has become socialized to view fathers against mothers.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“[T]here is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and 
integrity of Indian tribes than their children.”1 
 
																																								 																				
* First-year associate at Sinoski & Associates, PLLC, a family law firm in Houston, Texas; J.D. 2013, St. Mary’s 
University School of Law.  The author is greatly indebted to the editorial board and staff of the Columbia Journal of Race 
and Law for their careful editing and excellent suggestions.  The author’s use of the term “American Indian” in this 
Article (as opposed to “Native American”) to describe the Indigenous peoples of the United States is deliberate.  The 
over-used “Native American” label is viewed through a more pejorative filter, as it reflects the dark history of forced 
assimilation of the Indigenous people.  It was an oppressive, counterfeit identification “assigned” to that community 
during colonization, and thus is a term that exemplifies the repression of the Indigenous autonomy.  The author 
understands that “American Indian” is a more widely accepted term by various tribal members within the Indigenous 
community.  Please note that this assertion is based only on the author’s own personal research on the terminology 
preference of Indigenous peoples.  The author also recognizes the immutable impact her racial privilege as a non-
Indigenous individual has on her viewpoint and analysis on this particular subject. 
1 INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT, 25 U.S.C. §1901(3) (2016).  
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What is a “family?”  
 
There is a rich and complex history of the United States Supreme Court’s discourse on this particular 
question.  Its past treatment of the liberty of familial relationships has varied from the privileges a parent is 
constitutionally afforded to exert over their child,2 to discussing the visitation and custody rights of 
grandparents.3  Ultimately, the underlying message is that the right to private and family life is rooted in a 
relatively fundamental doctrinal basis that comports with the United States Constitution.4   
 
It has grown increasingly evident over the past several years that the social landscape of the United 
States has exponentially evolved, specifically in reference to how the family unit is defined.  There are families 
with single parents, children raised by older siblings, and, at present, there are also recent developments 
regarding the rights of same-sex couples to build their family units.5   
 
The experiences of adoptive families, especially cross-cultural adoptive families, have greatly enriched 
this dialogue of the ever-evolving family household.  There are approximately two million adopted children in 
the United States, of which nearly seventeen percent are adopted into cross-cultural families.6  Cross-cultural, 
cross-border and transracial adoptions have increased dramatically over the past twenty years.7  Adoptive Couple 
v. Baby Girl brought the complex intersectionality of child custody laws and race relations to a national stage,8 
causing lines to be drawn in the sand between grassroots American Indian rights activists supporting tribal 
law against the Justices of the United States Supreme Court and their interpretation of tribal law.  In reaching 
its holding, the Court goes beyond a surface discussion of the adoption system, centering its analysis on the 
statutory definition of a “parent” and whether Petitioner, the non-custodial biological father, had standing to 
object to Baby Girl’s adoption.   
 
This case highlighted the need for a closer examination on how the law dictating cross-cultural 
adoptions and parent-child relationships in the American Indian community are managed.  This case also 
																																								 																				
2 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72 (1976) (discussing a parent’s right to veto a child’s right to 
have an abortion); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (addressing the parental role in committing a child for 
treatment of mental illness). 
3 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 78 (2000) (Souter, J., concurrence). 
4 Courts have purported that the U.S. Constitution “protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the 
institutionof the family is deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition.” Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494, 503 (1977). See Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (discussing how the integrity of the family 
unit is rooted in protection afforded by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (discussing how the integrity of the family unit is also afforded protection by the 
Ninth Amendment) (Goldberg, J., concurrence). 
5 Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 656–57 (7th Cir. 2014); see U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2693–94 (2014) 
(noting the denial of spousal deduction to the surviving spouse of a same-sex couple); see generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S.Ct. 1732 (2015) (discussing the constitutionality of legalizing of same-sex marriage). 
6 AMY COUGHLIN & CARYN ABRAMOWITZ, CROSS-CULTURAL ADOPTION: HOW TO ANSWER QUESTIONS 
FROM FAMILY, FRIENDS, AND COMMUNITY xii (2004). 
7 Id. 
8 See Aura Bogado, The Cherokee Nation’s Baby Girl Goes on Trial, COLORLINES (Apr. 24, 2013 9:56 AM), 
http://www.colorlines.com/articles/cherokee-nations-baby-girl-goes-trial (noting that the Indian Child Welfare Act 
must be viewed with an understanding “that Natives hold a unique relationship with the federal government, one that is 
based on tribal sovereignty”); Abigail Perkiss, Supreme Court’s Upcoming Child-Custody Decision: The Baby Veronica Case, 
YAHOO! NEWS (Mar. 4, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/supreme-court-upcoming-child-custody-decision-
baby-veronica-110206332--politics.html; Andrew Cohen, Indian Affairs, Adoption, and Race: The Baby Veronica Case Comes to 
Washington, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/04/indian-affairs-
adoption-and-race-the-baby-veronica-case-comes-to-washington/274758/; Josh Voorhees, The Long, Complicated “Baby 
Veronica” Saga Comes to an Unsatisfying End, SLATE (July 17, 2013, 8:54 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2013/07/17/adoptive_couple_vs_baby_girl_south_carolina_court_sends_bab
y_veronica_back.html (illustrating the national media coverage of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl). 
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brought to attention the significance of preserving the racial and tribal ties of a community whose cultural 
heritage is growing increasingly insular, and also how the socialization of our view of fathers’ and mothers’ 
value in the family unit has arguably influenced how the adversarial system adjudicates family cases.  
II. SUMMARY OF CASE 
The Petitioner in Adoptive Couple was a man of Cherokee descent, whose girlfriend of primarily 
Hispanic descent (hereinafter referred to as “Birth Mother”) gave birth to a baby girl (hereinafter referred to 
as “Baby Girl”).9  For the duration of the pregnancy (and the subsequent four months after Baby Girl’s birth), 
Petitioner did not provide any financial assistance to Birth Mother.10  The relationship between the two 
parties ended while the Birth Mother was still pregnant with Baby Girl.11  Birth Mother proposed that 
Petitioner either pay child support for Baby Girl or relinquish his parental rights.12  Petitioner agreed to 
relinquish his parental rights, and Birth Mother placed Baby Girl for adoption, using a private agency that 
selected a married couple that happened to be White.13   
 
During the adoption proceedings, however, Petitioner asserted that he did not consent to the 
adoption.14  Rather, he insisted that at the time he signed the legal papers, he was under the impression that 
he was waiving his parental rights in favor of Birth Mother, not that he was consenting to adoption 
proceedings of Baby Girl commenced by the adoptive couple (hereinafter referred to as “Adoptive 
Couple”).15  Petitioner subsequently filed suit to stay the adoption proceedings and sought custody of Baby 
Girl stating that he did not consent to Baby Girl’s adoption.16  Moreover, Petitioner took a paternity test that 
confirmed that he was the biological father of Baby Girl.17 
 
The facts of this case were initially adjudicated under the South Carolina Family Court, which denied 
the adoption and required Adoptive Couple to transfer Baby Girl back to Petitioner.18  The South Carolina 
Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the decision.19 
A. South Carolina Supreme Court Decision 
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the South Carolina Family Court, 
denying the adoption and awarding Petitioner custody of Baby Girl. 20  This decision was largely rooted in the 
State Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Indian Child Welfare Act. 
 
The Indian Child Welfare Act (hereinafter referred to as “ICWA”) was: 
 
[t]he product of rising concern in the mid-1970’s over the consequences to 
Indian children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive child welfare 
practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian children 
from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care placement, 
usually in non-Indian homes.21 
																																								 																				





14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 Id. at 2559. 
17 Id. 
18 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 552 (S.C. 2012). 
19 Id.  
20 Id.  
21 Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989). 




 The State Supreme Court cited to evidence that twenty-five to thirty-five percent of American Indian 
children had been placed in adoptive families or foster care, and that approximately ninety percent of those 
placements were with non-Indian families.22  Many of these removals of American Indian children from their 
natural parents were employed with no foundation to intelligently evaluate the “cultural and social premises 
underlying Indian home life and childrearing.”23  Congress subsequently employed the Indian Child Welfare 
Act, whose purpose was to put an end to the “culturally inappropriate removal of Indian children.”24 
 
 The State Supreme Court first determined that application of the ICWA to the case was appropriate 
for two reasons: first, the case involved custody proceedings relating to an American Indian child,25 and 
second, Petitioner qualified as a “parent” within the parameters of the ICWA.  The ICWA defines a “parent” 
as “any biological parent or parents of an Indian child or any Indian person who has lawfully adopted an 
Indian child, including adoptions under tribal law or custom.”26  This definition does not expressly mention 
an unwed father whose paternity has yet to be formally acknowledged or established.27  The State Supreme 
Court found Petitioner to qualify as a “parent” within the parameters of the ICWA, contending that 
Petitioner acknowledged paternity through initiating court proceedings once he understood that Baby Girl had 
been put up for adoption.28  Furthermore, Petitioner’s biological paternity had been verified earlier by a DNA 
test during state court proceedings.29  Petitioner therefore was a “parent” defined by the ICWA and as held 
by the State Supreme Court.30 
 
Furthermore, the State Supreme Court’s decision to deny Baby Girl’s adoption was based on two 
distinct provisions of the ICWA: §1912(d) and §1912(f).  The State Supreme Court held that these two 
sections barred the termination of Petitioner’s parental rights.31  Section 1912(d) stated that in order to 
effectively terminate parental rights under the ICWA, the party seeking termination has to demonstrate to the 
Court that “efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to 
prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.”32  The State 
Supreme Court held that Adoptive Couple failed to show that such efforts had been made and therefore had 
not satisfied this provision of the ICWA. 
 
Section 1912(f) of the ICWA requires an expert finding “that the continued custody of the child by 
the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.”33  
Adoptive Couple erroneously interpreted the statute so that it applies to their specific set of facts, purporting 
that removing Baby Girl from their custody would be emotionally traumatic, thus qualifying as emotional 
damage that the ICWA statutorily requires.34  The State Supreme Court countered Adoptive Couple’s 
argument, stating that the plain language of the statute requires a showing that the “transferee parent’s” legal 
and physical custody of an American Indian child would lead to her emotional and physical damage, not that 
the removal from adoptive parents would lead to such damage.35  Consequently, the State Supreme Court held that 
Adoptive Couple failed to meet their burden of proving that Petitioner’s custody of Baby Girl would result in 
																																								 																				
22 Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 557. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 556. 
26 Id. at 560. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Adoptive Couple, 133 S.Ct. at 2573.    
30 Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 560. 
31 Adoptive Couple, 133 S.Ct. at 2559. 
32 Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 562. 
33 Id. at 562-63. 
34 Id. at 564. 
35 Id. 
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her subsequent physical and emotional harm.36  Due to the aforementioned reasons, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court denied the adoption of Baby Girl and transferred custody to Petitioner. 
 
Adoptive Couple appealed this holding, causing the case to reach the United States Supreme Court, 
which ultimately reversed South Carolina’s decision.  
B. United States Supreme Court Decision 
The Court’s reversal of the South Carolina Supreme Court decision—presented by Justice Samuel 
Alito—was based in the analysis of two above-mentioned provisions of the ICWA: §1912(d) and §1912(f).  
Justice Alito’s stark, textualist approach to interpreting these provisions is quite evident here because he used 
Webster’s Dictionary and the American Heritage Dictionary as the framework to analyze the statutory text.37  
Section 1912(d) provides that anyone seeking to terminate the parental rights to an Indian child must first 
demonstrate remedial efforts made to prevent the breakup of the American Indian family.38  He argued that 
the term “breakup” refers in the context of Adoptive Couple to the “discontinuance of a relationship”39 or a 
“disruption, separation into parts, disintegration”40 of an entity.  In other words, the term “breakup” must be 
prefaced with evidence that there was an example of a familial link or affiliation to begin with.  Justice Alito 
stated that, when an Indian parent abandons its child prior to birth and never subsequently obtains legal or 
physical custody of that child, no relationship is ever solidified.41  Therefore, any contention made by the 
South Carolina court that would suggest any discontinuance or disruption of Petitioner’s familial link to Baby 
Girl would be obsolete as there was no relationship to begin with.  Justice Alito concluded, therefore, that 
Section 1912(d) is not applicable in this case as Petitioner never had custody of Baby Girl and never 
established parental rights.42  Accordingly, Adoptive Couple was not in error for failing to comport with the 
statutory text requiring remedial services to be provided to Petitioner. 
    
Justice Alito proceeded by turning towards Section 1912(f) of the ICWA.  This particular provision 
of the ICWA provides that no termination of parental rights shall be ordered in the absence of a finding that 
the continued custody of the child by the Indian custodian “is likely to result in serious emotional or physical 
damage to the child.”43 
 
Justice Alito placed emphasis on the qualifier “continued” when discussing custody, supplementing his 
opinion regarding Section 1912(d).  He noted that the phrase “continued custody” refers to custody of a child 
that a parent already possesses or has possessed at some point in the past.44  With this contextual explanation 
in place, Justice Alito re-emphasized the significance of Petitioner’s absence of a familial connection with 
Baby Girl.  If “continued” custody refers to some form of pre-existing custodial relationship between a child 
and its custodian,45 Justice Alito concluded that Petitioner once more fails to exemplify any standing in his 
case, as he never had possession, access or custody of Baby Girl prior to his initiating this suit against her 
adoptive parents.46   
																																								 																				
36 Id. at 563. 
37 Id. at 11. 
38 Adoptive Couple, 133 S.Ct. at 2557. 
39 Id. at 2555. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 2562. 
42 Id.  But when an Indian parent abandons an Indian child prior to birth and that child has never been in the 
Indian parent’s legal or physical custody, there is no “relationship” that would be “discontinue[ed]–and no “effective 
entity” that would have “end[ed]–by the termination of the Indian parent’s rights.  In such a situation, the “breakup of 
the Indian family” has long since occurred, and §1912(d) is inapplicable.  Id. at 2555. 
43 Id. at 2556. 
44 Id. at 2555. 
45 Id. at 2560. 
46 See id. (noting that “§1912(f) does not apply in cases where the Indian parent never had custody of the Indian 
child”).   




His opinion contends that a reasonable understanding of the ICWA’s purpose makes it evidently 
clear as to why Petitioner would not be eligible for standing against Adoptive Couple and why the South 
Carolina Supreme Court’s decision was in error: its fundamental purpose is to preserve the standards for the 
removal of Indian children from their families,47 not to create parental rights for noncustodial or unwed 
parents who otherwise would not possess such rights as the South Carolina Supreme Court suggests.48 
  
Justice Alito further argued that §§1912(d) and 1912(f) should be interpreted harmoniously, 
emphasizing the significance of the “continued custody” requirement.49  Additionally, he reiterated that the 
ICWA was enacted to preserve the cultural ties of the Indian community.50  His concern, however, was that 
Petitioner utilized this culturally-sensitive purpose to his advantage as a “trump card” to override the decision 
of Biological Mother’s decision to proceed with adoption of Baby Girl.  Permitting Petitioner to frame his 
argument narrowly on this issue would ratify the decision of any Indian parent to intervene in the adoption of 
his child by non-Indians, even in the case when that Indian parent had no previous relationship with the child 
or showed any desire to have a relationship with the child.51 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Narrow Interpretation of “Parent” 
The initial reason why the Court’s analysis is flawed is due to the rather hollow interpretation of the 
term “parent” as defined by the bounds of the Indian Child Welfare Act.  This distorted interpretation is the 
Court’s principal rationale for its holding.  The Court’s understanding of who qualifies as a “parent” is far too 
narrow, qualifying individuals as “parents” only if their behavior comports with having continued custody of 
the child or children subject to the suit.  Section 1912(f) of the ICWA purports that there can be no 
termination of parental rights without a finding that the “continued custody of the child by the parent or 
Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.”52  
 
The Court examines “continued custody” as a qualifier for an individual to have standing as a 
“parent” under the statutory language of the ICWA.  This examination, however, is far too constricting.  The 
Court contends that the phrase “continued custody” refers to custody that a parent presently has or has had 
at some point in the past.53  Hence, their analysis concludes that an Indian parent who never had custody of an 
Indian child would not qualify as a parent.54 
 
Applying this analysis to the facts of the case presents the idea that Petitioner would not have 
standing as a “parent” because he never had custody of Baby Girl either before or for the duration of the 
case.  However, through this narrow examination, the Court, whether deliberately or not, created a separate 
class of individuals who should be afforded substantive protections under the ICWA. 
 
There is a uniform understanding that the definition of “parent” bestows certain procedural and 
fundamental rights.55  Illogically defining a parent by his or her ability to have custody of the child in question 
unfairly creates a sub-class of individuals who would not be recognized as parents under the law and 
																																								 																				
47 Id. at 2563. 
48 The Court’s interpretation of the ICWA was not meant to create parental rights for Indian parents, but rather 
to protect “Indian parents who are already part of an Indian family.”  Id.  
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 2565. 
51 Id. at 2565–66. 
52 Id. at 2557–58. 
53 Id. at 2560. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 2575. 
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therefore would not be afforded the procedural and substantive protections that come with being a parent 
such as directing the child’s religious upbringing or making decisions about the child’s safety, health and 
welfare.56 
 
Individuals who may not have physical custody or even legal custody of their child—such as those 
who may pay child support, or only have visitation rights—are still very much parents.57  Such individuals 
may not have continued custody of the child in question as Justice Alito discusses, but still very much 
contribute to the child’s well-being and emotional development.  By the Court’s logic, even these individuals 
should not be recognized as parents under the law. 
 
The function of the U.S. Supreme Court is to interpret the law,58 as they do here.  But by interpreting 
the law as narrowly as the Court does in this case, the Court comes dangerously close to taking over the 
legislative role of defining legal terms and concepts by reformulating “parent” to really mean “custodial 
parent.”  By the Court’s reasoning, the ICWA only protects the rights of a specific class of parents.  The 
implicit argument is that Congress never intended to protect an Indian parent whose parental rights—for 
whatever reason—may have been terminated and who subsequently would make efforts through the courts 
to reinstate them. 
B. Narrow Understanding of ICWA’s Purpose 
The other reason behind the Court’s flawed opinion is their dismissive examination of the ICWA’s 
central purpose: to preserve tribal familial ties.59  The Court argues that their holding comports with this 
purpose.60  However, this assertion is faulty considering the Court’s narrow analysis of the ICWA’s cultural 
and tribal-preserving objectives, coupled with its failure to understand the larger social context of the 
significance of fulfilling these objectives.  Justice Alito insists that the Court’s interpretation of the ICWA is 
congruent with the statute’s intention to preserve cultural and social ties between children and their respective 
tribal communities.61 
 
Historically, the judicial community has utilized various methods of statutory interpretation.  
Textualism and plain meaning are the two most prominent methods used by the Court in presenting its 
opinion.62  Scholars, however, have proposed additional methods of interpreting statutory text such as 
utilizing “public values” as a backdrop in conducting analyses.63  “Public values” refers to the fundamental 
																																								 																				
56 See, e.g.,TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §151.001 (discussing the duties and rights of a parent, including the right to 
the care and control of the child, the right to represent the child in legal action, the right to direct the religious and moral 
training of the child and the right to determine the child’s primary residence); CAL. FAM. CODE ANN. §3006 (noting that 
parents have the right to make decisions relating to the child’s health and safety); MINN. FAM. CODE ANN. 
§518.17(3)(a)(1) (addressing a parent’s right of access to information regarding the child’s health and dental insurance, 
school reports and any other important documents).  
57 See, e.g., id. at §§153.014–.015, 153.191–193 (noting the parental rights afforded to non-custodial or 
possessory parents including visitation); IND. FAM. CODE ANN. §31-17-4-1(a) (discussing the visitation rights of a non-
custodial parent); see also S.C. FAM. CODE ANN. §63-15-250(A) (addressing a non-custodial parent’s right to communicate 
with his child via telephone or electronically). 
58 U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2. 
59 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S.Ct. 2552, 2553 (2013). 
60 Id. at 2555. 
61 Id. 
62 See id. at 2555, 2560, 2567 (noting Justice Alito’s reference to the American Heritage Dictionary, Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary and the Oxford Dictionary in interpreting the statutory language of the ICWA). 
63 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1007 (1989) 
(illuminating that “an important role of constitutional interpretation is to articulate and enforce ‘public values’ for our 
nation”); see id. at 1007–08  (“Public values . . . are legal norms and principles that form underlying precepts for our 
polity—background norms that contribute to and result from the moral development of our political community.  
Public values appeal to conceptions of justice and the common good . . . .”). 
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commandments that underline our civic system—notions of common good and social justice that further the 
desires of the collective, rather than one particular group or individual.64  The appeal of public values in 
statutory interpretation is two-pronged: first, such values may foster greater congruity in statutory law, and 
second, may update said statutes so that they better reflect modern public policy.65  Such a method would be 
more appropriate to employ in the instant case (more so than the blunt quasi-textualist approach the Court 
utilizes) as it involves sensitive issues (race and family relations) that generally require scrutiny to be 
conducted with a more considerate, diplomatic approach. 
 
Simply put, the Court’s opinion exemplifies its lack of understanding of how and why the collective 
historical experience of the American Indian community provides it with the heightened necessity to protect 
and preserve its cultural ties arguably more so in contrast to other communities of color in the United States.  
The ICWA does not only protect the interests of Indian parents, but of the respective Indian tribe as a 
whole.66  Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion emphasizes the significance of linking generational ties to 
sustain a tribal community’s longevity by noting the adverse impact of placing Indian children in homes with 
no connection to tribal communities.67 
 
The elephant in the discussion of transracial and cross-cultural adoptions is the issue of the “cultural 
authenticity” in selecting adoptive parents for these types of adoptions.68  If, for example, Latinos are 
considered best suited to parent Latino children, the natural implication is that a non-Latino couple would be 
less suited to parent Latino children.69  This is based on the assumption that a Latino couple would have a 
better comprehension of that child’s racial experiences.70 
 
The above-mentioned assertion does not equate to an absolute condemnation of cross-cultural 
adoptions.  Such a suggestion would exponentially impede on the fundamental right to build a family unit, 
particularly for those individuals who may have to look to alternative resources.71  However, for those who 
decide to move forward in a cross-cultural adoption, it is essential to reiterate the significance of the adopted 
child having close ties to his cultural community and preserving his racial identity.72 
 
The African American,73 Asian American74 and Latino75 experience have become so immersed into 
the American cultural Diaspora, that a child of color who may be adopted by a Caucasian family would easily 
																																								 																				
64 Id. at 1008. 
65 Id. at 1009. 
66 Adoptive Couple, 133 S.Ct. at 2561 (“the purpose of the [ICWA] is to . . . promote the stability and security of 
Indian tribes[.]”). 
67 Id. 
68 Kevin Noble Maillard, Parental Ratification: Legal Manifestations of Cultural Authenticity in Cross-Racial Adoptions, 28 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 107, 120 (2003). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 See Meagan R. Marold, Ice, Ice, Baby! The Division of Frozen Embryos at the Time of Divorce, 25 HASTINGS 
WOMEN’S L.J. 179, 179–80 (2014) (discussing the numerous medical options available to families suffering with 
infertility, such as in vitro fertilization); see also Fast Facts About Infertility, RESOLVE: NAT’L INFERTILITY ASS’N, 
http://www.resolve.org/about/fast-facts-about-fertility.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/ (last updated Apr. 19, 
2015) (noting that approximately twelve percent of married women “have trouble getting pregnant or sustaining a 
pregnancy”).  
72	Deborah Beasley, 12 Ways to Honor the Culture, Ethnicity, and Heritage of Your Adopted Child, HOW 
DOES YOUR CHILD GROW—UNDERSTANDING YOUR CHILD FROM THE INSIDE OUT! (May 20, 2010), 
https://howdoesyourchildgrow.wordpress.com/2010/05/20/12-ways-to-honor-the-culture-ethnicity-and-heritage-of-
your-adopted-child/#comments (listing ways to “fill the gap between the culture and ethnicity of [an adoptee child, her] 
adoptive parents and the development of their own ethnic and cultural identities”).	
73	See EDWARD J. BLUM & JASON R. YOUNG, THE SOULS OF W.E.B. DUBOIS: NEW ESSAYS AND REFLECTIONS, 
56 (Mercer University Press 2009) (proposing if “America [would] have been America without her Negro people?”); 
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have access to resources that would create cultural ties between that child and her racial community.  If, say, a 
non-African American couple were to adopt an African American child, that child would have access to many 
resources that would help create and sustain ties to his African American heritage such as attending a 
predominantly African American church or joining a cultural center.  These might be somewhat superficial 
methods to fostering a link between the child and his community, but doing do would at least create a vehicle 
in providing cultural solidarity for that child. 76  These ties may be somewhat surfaced, but they at least create 
a bridge in which that child can develop multiple relationships with other African American, Asian American 
and Latino individuals.  An American Indian child, however, would have a very different experience from his 
counterparts. 
 
The culture and traditional practices of these tribal communities may be preserved, but have been 
preserved in isolation by the inherent nature of their living circumstances.  The majority of American Indian 
individuals experience very insular living conditions by residing on reservations, which were historically put in 
place for the purpose of isolating the American Indian community from European-populated areas.77  Both 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities around the country make efforts to present these cultural 
practices to a larger audience, by hosting festivals or curating museums that center on the American Indian 
experience; but these sorts of resources would not aid an adopted American Indian child in developing any 
form of solidarity with his heritage. 
 
To further explain, these types of resources and programs, although educational, are somewhat 
superficial, designed to have the culture observed from a “fish-tank,” quasi-tourist perspective rather than to 
generating an extensive understanding of the tribal community.  This is not the fault of those who coordinate 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
Gregory Rodriguez, The Nation: Mexican-Americans; Forging a New Vision of America’s Melting Pot, NY TIMES (Feb. 11, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/11/weekinreview/the-nation-mexican-americans-forging-a-new-vision-of-america-
s-melting-pot.html (noting one of the many significant ways the African American community contributed to the 
multicultural movement, notably through “its key moral impetus” in advocating for racial integration during the Civil 
Rights Movement); Americas Cultural Roots Traced to Enslaved African Ancestors, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 28, 
2010), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/02/0205_030205_jubilee4_2.html (noting the African imprint 
on American cuisine, musical expression, even various forms of oral literature).	
74 See generally Leah Binkovitz, From the Civil War to Civil Rights: The Many Ways Asian Americans Have Shaped the 
Country, SMITHSONIAN.COM (May 3, 2013), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/from-the-civil-
war-to-civil-rights-the-many-ways-asian-americans-have-shaped-the-country-49762201/?no-ist (discussing Asian 
influence on American culture). 
75	See BECOMING AMERICAN: BEYOND THE MELTING POT, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 7, 
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/korea/49271/march_2011/en_0111_immigration.pdf (discussing how immigrants 
from Latin America have helped transform “the American pluralistic culture”); see also Rodriguez, supra note 73.	
76 Darron T. Smith, Raising Culturally Responsive Black Children in White Adoptive Homes: Uncovering the importance of 
Code-Switching in the Battlefield of Racial Identity Development, HUFFPOST BLACK VOICES (Jan. 29, 2013, 12:08 P.M.), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/darron-t-smith-phd/adopted-black-children_b_2550751.html (last updated Mar. 30, 
2013).  Non-Black adoptive parents have many resources to bolster a Black adoptive child’s to be culturally response by 
“mov[ing] into more racially integrated communities, attend an African American church and other social functions, and 
finally, increase friendships with more African Americans of equal status.”  Id.  
77 THE DAWES ACT OF 1887, 25 U.S.C. §349 (2016).  The Dawes Act was a precursor to the “reservation 
system,” first employed in 1887 to survey American Indian tribal land and apportion it to individual Indians.  See Life on 
the Reservations, U.S. HISTORY: PRE-COLUMBIAN TO THE NEW MILLENNIUM, http://www.ushistory.org/us/40d.asp (last 
visited June 30, 2015) (noting that every “Native American family was offered 160 acres of tribal land to own outright”).  
Gary D. Sandefur, AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS: THE FIRST UNDERCLASS AREAS?, INST. FOR RESEARCH FOR 
POVERTY, 37–38, http://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/focus/pdfs/foc121f.pdf (discussing the genesis of 
“reservations” in the United States, and its present function as both a reservoir to preserve Indigenous “sovereignty and 
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such programs, but because the cultural experiences of American Indians are packaged and presented in such 
a surfaced way, it would be difficult to properly develop a fortified relationship between the culture and the 
child who descends from that culture.  Conversely, an African American child adopted by non-African 
American parents would have more substantive and cultural outlets, as his heritage has not been as 
historically secluded from that of his American Indian counterpart. 
 
The Court’s opinion makes it evident that it did not have a firm grasp of the historical context 
behind the ICWA’s purpose.  The opinion also demonstrates why, on a larger scale, cross-cultural adoptions 
must be handled conscientiously for the sake of the child’s emotional and mental development and to 
facilitate the development, appreciation and identification with their culture.78  The significance of an 
adoptee’s relationship to her heritage is incontrovertible79 and it is evident that the Court did not have an 
understanding of this when presenting its opinion.80 
 
Furthermore, there are several times throughout the Court’s opinion that Baby Girl is referred to 
repeatedly and unnecessarily as being only 3/256 Cherokee.81  It is perhaps done unintentionally, but by 
doing so, the Court qualifies her Indian ancestry as insignificant, which informs their opinion that Baby Girl 
has no true link to her American Indian roots.  This dismissive attitude of the racial identification of the child, 
coupled with Justice Alito’s “trump card” reference82 suggests that Petitioner is utilizing “race” as a 
commodity to obtain his parental rights.  Not only is this suggestion off-putting and insensitive, but it also 
speaks to the broader issue of White privilege when these Supreme Court opinions are developed. 
 
To suggest that a member of an oppressed social group would use his social identity to his 
“advantage” to override a legal decision or obtain whatever it is that he wants, adds to the collective rhetoric 
wrongfully impeded on oppressed communities—for example, communities of color, the queer community, 
women, the immigrant community—suggesting that they would exploit the racist, sexist or classist attitudes 
of others to obtain their desires.  It paints the Petitioner’s decision-making with a broad brush, dismissing the 
fact that he made his decision based on a number of relevant factors, including the fact that he never 
consented to the adoption of Baby Girl.  However, the Court wrongfully minimizes Petitioner’s decision-
making to “playing the race card.” 
C. Larger Sociological View of Fathers v. Mothers 
Family cases such as these bring to attention of the larger discussion of deciphering the constitutional 
framework of fathers’ rights.  As a society we have arguably been conditioned to view mothers very 
differently than fathers.83  Some scholars suggest that this socialization has influenced the court system in 
																																								 																				
78 Beasley, supra note 72; see generally, Delma L. Francis, Successful Transracial Adoptions Require Cross-Cultural 
Senstivity, MINNPOST (Nov. 20, 2007), https://www.minnpost.com/arts-culture/2007/11/successful-transracial-
adoptions-require-cross-cultural-sensitivity (outlining a “cross-cultural” approach in engaging with transracial adoptees). 
79 Id. 
80 Supra III.B. 
81 Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2556, 2559, 2566. 
82 Id. at 2565. 
83 See Mothering vs. Fathering?, WORD CHOICES (Feb. 26, 2015), 
http://wordchoicesoprfhs.blogspot.com/2015/02/mothering-vs-fathering.html (describing how the “concept of 
‘mothering’ has become entirely female . . . that there is an increased separation between men and women because of 
their social location . . . ”); id. (suggesting that “there is a reason why mothers and fathers have continued to maintain 
their current roles. . . . [t]here are certain things that only a mother can give to a child, just like there are certain things 
that only a father can give to a child.”); Jennifer Senior, Why Mom’s Time is Different from Dad’s Time, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 
2014, 11:32 p.m.), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304757004579335053525792432 (addressing how 
mothers are still primarily responsible for household even though they work roughly the same amount of hours as 
fathers); Sally S. Tusa, Mom v. Dad: Whose Doing the Work?, PARENTING, http://www.parenting.com/article/mom-vs-
dad-whos-doing-the-work (discussing the arguably contrasting parenting skills between fathers and mothers in the 
household); John Piper, Do Mothers and Fathers Have Different Roles in Parenting?, Desiring God (Oct. 3, 2008), 
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yielding decisions that favor mothers over fathers, particularly in conservatorship cases.84  This framework is 
not present in the instant case as Petitioner is seeking conservatorship from the adoptive parents rather than 
the biological mother of the child.  Nevertheless, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl is still a very important case to 
add to the discourse about fathers’ rights in familial cases—particularly in the discussion of the statutory 
definition of what a “parent” is and what the definition subsequently entails. 
 
Stanley v. Illinois was the paramount U.S. Supreme Court case to first recognize fathers as their own 
class in need of constitutional protection underneath the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.85  The Plaintiff was an unwed father who brought suit against the State of Illinois, challenging a 
statute that did not afford him the opportunity to a hearing on his parental fitness before his children were 
taken as wards of the State after the death of their mother.86  The Court framed the Plaintiff’s interest by 
contending that “[t]he private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably 
warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.”87  The Stanley Court ultimately 
held that denying Plaintiff such a hearing when unwed mothers and divorced parents were afforded such 
hearing violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.88  This case parallels with 
Adoptive Couple, as the definition of “parent” was also discussed by the Court as one of the more integral 
factors in determining the parental rights of the unwed father.89 
 
This was the genesis of a series of cases litigated in the U.S. Supreme Court that brought to attention 
the rights of fathers in an institution that arguably had categorized their rights as expendable.  Caban v. 
Mohammed,90  Quilloin v. Walcott,91 and Michael H. v. Gerald D.92 were all post-Stanley decisions that added new 
voices to the constitutional rights of fathers on national platform. 
 
However, the integral difference between the prominent Stanley case and Adoptive Couple is that the 
Plaintiff in Stanley had custody of his children before their mother’s death, whereas the Adoptive Couple 
Petitioner never had custody of Baby Girl prior to the filing of his suit.  Stanley affirmed the constitutional 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
http://www.desiringgod.org/interviews/do-fathers-and-mothers-have-different-roles-in-parenting (suggesting that it is 
the father’s responsibility to carry out discipline of children, not the mother’s).    
84 Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 381 (1979) (“Maternal and paternal roles are not invariably different in 
importance. Even if unwed mothers as a class were closer than unwed fathers to their newborn infants, the 
generalization concerning parent-child relations would become less acceptable to support legislative distinctions as the 
child's age increased.”); see Kara L. Boucher & Ruthann M. Macolini, The Parental Rights of Unwed Fathers: A Developmental 
Perspective, 20 N.C. CENT. L.J. 45, 45 (1992) (“Courts treat unwed fathers inconsistently across jurisdictions, generally 
focusing on the existence and quality of the relationship between the unwed father and his child without consulting 
relevant social science literature.”). 
85 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658—59, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972). Stanley’s claim in the state courts and here is 
that failure to afford him a hearing on his parental qualifications while extending it to other parents denied him equal 
protection of the laws […] Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children 
are removed from their custody.  [D]enying such a hearing to Stanley and those like him while granting it to other 
Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause. Id. 
86 Id. at 646.  
87 Id. at 651. 
88 Id. at 658–59.  
89 Id. at 664–65. 
90 See Caban, 441 U.S. at 380 (finding that a New York statute that permitted a child’s unwed mother to 
withhold her consent and foreclose that child’s adoption, but did not allow a child’s unwed father to do the same was 
violative of the father’s constitutional rights).   
91 See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,  246 (1978) (noting Supreme Court’s holding that “[e]qual protection 
principles do not require that [natural father’s] authority to veto an adoption be measured by the same standard as is 
applied to a divorced father”).    
92 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 159 (1989) (discussing that “fathers who have participated in 
raising their illegitimate children and have developed a relationship with them have constitutionally protected parental 
rights”). 
12																															Case Comment: Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013)	 						Vol. 6:2	
	
	
protection of unwed fathers’ parental rights, but left unanswered the question of the parental rights of unwed 
fathers who did not raise their children.  This absence of protection for this particular class of fathers is 
glaringly evident in the opinion presented by the Adoptive Couple Court, who freely interpreted “parent” in 
such a narrow way that unwed fathers without custody had no means of having their parental rights 
statutorily or constitutionally protected.  If parameters were established to afford legislative protection for this 
class of fathers in a post-Stanley world, the holding for the Adoptive Couple Petitioner may have had a different 
outcome. 
 
Speculation as to whether the case would have been held differently if Petitioner had been the 
biological mother rather than the father of Baby Girl may appear obsolete.  Such theorizing, however, is 
important as the Adoptive Couple holding adds to the narrative of fathers’ parental rights and the issue of their 
Equal Protection, particularly for the “sub-class” of parents that  Justice Alito delineates in the Court’s 
opinion.  The Adoptive Couple Court fails to recognize the importance of the biological connection93 between a 
father and his child as it affords him an opportunity to develop a relationship with that child, embrace some 
measure of responsibility for that child and subsequently “enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship 
and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child’s development.”94 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Court’s opinion is constructed far too narrowly, grounding the majority of its analysis on the 
lone, imprecise phrase “continued custody.”95  Placing so much interpretive weight on this one phrase, 
coupled with the Court’s distorted reading of the term “parent” within the meaning of the ICWA, is why the 
Court’s opinion is fundamentally flawed. 
 
Additionally, the Court’s opinion also reflects a lack of understanding of the larger contextual issues 
rooted in the Petitioner’s case regarding race relations and the rights of unwed fathers.  The Court insists that 
its opinion aligns with the ICWA’s fundamental purpose of conserving tribal and cultural ties between the 
American Indian community and its children.96  Their persistence that their finding is harmonious with the 
statute’s purpose further illustrates their ignorance of race relations and racial identity.  This is exemplified 
primarily by qualifying Baby Girl’s racial identification as extraneous, but also by its off-putting language 
alluding to Petitioner “race-baiting” as a way to challenge the holding, and finally by suggesting that the true 
test of equal protection for Petitioner as an unwed father is rooted in a legal relationship rather than a 
biological one.97 
																																								 																				
93 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983). 
94 Id. 
95 Adoptive Couple, 133 S.Ct. at 2557 (2013).   
96 Id. at 2555, 2561. 
97 See id. at 2555 (illuminating the Court’s contention that Petitioner did not qualify as a parent under the ICWA 
“because he had never had legal or physical custody of Baby Girl at the time of the adoption proceedings”). 
